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Abstract
We consider a two-candidate election model with campaign contributions. In the first stage
of the game, each of two candidates chooses a policy position. In the second stage, each of
n lobbyists chooses the amount of contribution to each candidate. The winning probability of
each candidate depends on the total amount of contributions that she raised from the lobbyists.
In any equilibrium of our model, only extreme lobbyists contribute at any subgame, and the
policies converge on the unique equilibrium path. Our results suggest that extreme lobbyists
and their contributions do not necessarily cause policies to diverge.
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1 Introduction
Electoral candidates run campaigns to influence the outcomes of the elections. One major deter-
minant of the campaigns’ success is contributions from interest groups. Contributions made to US
presidential campaigns are quite large, thus attracting the attention of many media outlets. In the
2012 Presidential election, the winner Obama raised more than 720 million US dollars, and even
the loser Romney raised about 450 million dollars. Furthermore, the candidates’ policy positions
seem to affect the flow of political contributions. For example, unsurprisingly, the vast majority of
political contributions from gay and lesbian interest groups have gone to Democrats. In the 2012
election cycle, only 7 percent of this money went to a Republican national candidate or political
committee.1 Thus, given the impact of contributions, it is important for candidates to deliberate
the way their policy positions affect the contributions, which in turn affects the outcome of the
election. This paper studies how the outcomes of elections are affected by policy choices through
contributions by interest groups.
To motivate our analysis, let us start by the observation that donors’ ideological positions are of-
ten said to be extreme and polarized. For example, Barber (2016), McElwee (2016), and McElwee
et al. (2016) report that such polarization occurs at various levels: presidential, senate, and mayoral
elections. The effect of such a polarization on the manifest choices, however, is ambiguous. Some
suggest that donors’ polarization causes manifests’ polarization (e.g., Verba et al. (1995) and Miller
and Schofield (2003)), while others argue there is no such causal relationship (e.g., La Raja and
Wiltse (2011)). This paper examines the theoretical foundation for the causal relationship. We find
that only extreme lobbyists would donate, and uncover a novel force that political contributions
have. Specifically, we argue that the possibilities of contributions by extreme lobbyists make the
policies converge, not diverge. Thus, our analysis is consistent with the observation that donors are
polarized, and provides a theoretical rationale for the argument that there be no causal relationship
1The numbers stated in this paragraph are cited from The Center for Responsible Politics (2018).
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between donors’ and manifests’ polarizations.
Specifically, we characterize subgame perfect equilibria of a two-stage game in which two
office-seeking candidates set policies in the first stage and then contributions are made by n interest
groups in the second stage, taking into account the policy positions chosen in the first stage.2 In
order to focus on the effect of contributions on the election outcome, we postulate that the amounts
of contributions are the sufficient statistic of the election outcome. Taking into account the effect
that the policy choices have on the amount of contributions, candidates strategically choose their
positions to maximize electability.
In our model, we show the extremist dominance result and the policy convergence result. The
extremist dominance result states that in each subgame (i.e., for each realized policy profile on and
off the equilibrium path), no interest groups except the two extreme groups (i.e., the leftmost and
the rightmost groups) contribute to any candidates. This result is consistent with the observation
that donors are polarized. However, polarization of active donors does not necessary imply that of
policies: The policy convergence result states that the two candidates set the same policy in any
subgame perfect equilibrium of our model.
To see the intuition for extremist dominance, consider two left-wing lobbyists where one is
more extreme than the other, as in Figure 1. First of all, neither lobbyist has an incentive to
contribute to the right-wing candidate. To see who will contribute to the left-wing candidate, notice
that the difference of payoffs that the extreme lobbyist perceives from the two candidates is larger
than that of the moderate lobbyist.3 Thus the extreme lobbyist’s marginal benefit of contribution
is always larger than that of the moderate lobbyist. Given that we measure the utilities in common
monetary units, this entails that the marginal cost of contribution cannot be equal to the marginal
benefits for both lobbyists, implying that the moderate lobbyist’s contribution must be zero.
2The assumption that the candidates’ policy positions affect the contributors’ (utilities and hence) decisions is
consistent with the empirical literature (see, e.g., Bonica (2014) and Barber et al. (2017)). We however note that this is
not a view for which there is a consensus: Hill and Huber (2016) suggest that ideology plays no role when individual
donors distinguish among same-party candidates.
3Formally, this follows from the single-crossing condition that we will assume.
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Figure 1: Graphical intuition for extremist dominance: Green and blue curves correspond to the
two lobbyists’ utility functions. The blue lobbyist perceives a smaller utility difference than the
green lobbyist, and hence does not contribute in equilibrium.
Given extremist dominance, the heart of the intuition for policy convergence can be explained
as follows: When two policies differ, a candidate’s approach to the other policy has asymmetric
effects on the marginal benefits from contributions by the two extreme interest groups. Specifically,
consider the situation where the left-wing candidate moves to the right by a small amount. This
movement decreases the amounts of contributions from both lobbyists, but our assumption that
the utility functions are concave implies that, as Figure 2 illustrates, the left-wing interest group
perceives a small change in payoffs from such a movement, compared to the change that the right-
wing interest group perceives. Thus the amount that the right-wing lobbyist would decrease the
contribution by is more significant than that of the left-wing lobbyist. This implies, with some
assumptions on the winning probability function, an increase of the winning probability for the
left candidate.4
Examining this from another angle may help: What prevents a candidate from moving towards
4The actual proof has more subtlety, and we formalize it in the analysis that follows.
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Figure 2: Graphical intuition for policy convergence: Green and blue curves correspond to the
two lobbyists’ utility functions (the utility functions are allowed to be asymmetric). When the left
candidate moves to the right, the green lobbyist perceives a small change of the utility while the
blue lobbyist perceives a large difference. This, combined with our assumption on the winning
probability function, implies policy convergence.
her own donor? An usual argument would postulate that moving towards the own donor would
increase the contribution from that donor. This is true in our model. At the same time, however,
it also increases the contribution from the other donor to the opposition candidate. An example
of this is Meg Whitman’s contribution to Hilary Clinton, calling Donald Trump an “authoritarian
character” and a threat to democracy (Becker, 2016). Another example would be the £400,000
donation to Best for Britain for an anti-Brexit campaign by George Soros, who is accused of
“forcing his views on societies and even destroying them” (Henley, 2018). In our model, such a
countervailing effect prevents a candidate from catering to the extreme donor.
To understand the contribution of this study, it would be useful to compare it with the “collec-
tive policies” model of Baron (1994).5 He considers a two-candidate two-lobbyist model with the
5Baron (1994) studies the cases of “collective policies” and of “particularistic policies,” and his analysis of the latter
predicts policy divergence. The reason for the divergence is that in his model, given that interest group k contributes
to candidate i, the amount of such a contribution is independent of the other candidate −i’s position. In our model,
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same timeline as ours and also obtains a policy-convergence result, but for a different reason. The
key assumptions behind his result are that (i) two types of voters cast votes, where “uninformed
voters" only respond to campaign funds, and “informed voters" only respond to the policy posi-
tions, and that (ii) the utility functions of interest groups are linear.6 The linearity implies that the
ratio of utility differences that interest groups perceive between two candidates is independent of
the policies chosen by the candidates. With his modeling assumptions, this further implies that
the ratio of the campaign funds raised by the candidates is constant, and consequently, the voting
behavior of the uninformed voters is also independent of policy profile. Hence, candidates only
compete for votes from the informed voters. Therefore, the standard median voter theorem applies
and leads to policy convergence.
Put differently, in Baron’s (1994) model of collective policies, political contributions have no
effect at all to determine equilibrium policies due to the linearity of lobbyist utilities. In contrast,
our model assumes concave lobbyist utilities, and we show that in such a setting, different pol-
icy profiles induce different winning probabilities through those contributions and hence, policy
convergence arises from the competition for uninformed voters.
Persson and Tabellini (2000, Section 7.5.1) also offer a model of political contribution that
has the same timing structure as ours and predicts policy convergence. Their model has two key
assumptions; namely, (i) each lobbyist’s maximization problem is independent of other lobby-
ists’ contribution amount, and (ii) each candidate’s maximization problem is independent of other
candidates’ policy position. Property (i) implies that extremist dominance fails (all lobbyists con-
tribute whenever two policies are different), while property (ii) implies that policy convergence
holds. Although policy convergence is common between the two models, their logic is different
from ours because in our setting each candidate’s best response is to position as close as possible
contrastingly, k’s contribution to i increases when −i’s position moves away from k’s ideal policy, and this diminishes
−i’s incentive to diverge.
6Baron (1994) assumes that each candidate is associated with one interest group, and each interest group contributes
the amount that changes linearly with the policy position. One way to interpret this specification is to consider interest
groups situated at the extreme points of the policy space and to assume that they have a linear utility function.
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to the opponent candidate’s policy, i.e., property (ii) fails in our model.
In contrast, Glazer and Gradstein (2005), again with the same timing structure, argue that
the candidates cater to extreme lobbyists. The key assumption behind their analysis is that the
candidates maximize the contribution they collect rather than the winning probabilities. This in
particular implies that the effect of a candidate’s policy change on the amount of the contribution
the opposition collects is not taken into account. Consequently, the candidates cater to the extreme
lobbyists because those lobbyists are willing to contribute more than the moderates. In our model,
collecting more contribution is not necessarily good for a candidate to maximize his winning prob-
ability, as a policy choice that increases the contribution to him also increases the contribution to
his opponent.
Austen-Smith (1987) and Baron (1989) also consider models with the same timing as ours (i.e.,
policy choice first and then contributions). Austen-Smith (1987) does not predict the exact policy
positions, but only the relative change of the positions compared with the ones in the case with no
contribution. In Baron’s (1989) model, candidates in his model do not choose policies but “service
levels" to lobbyists.
Some other papers have considered different timing structures than ours. Grossman and Help-
man (1996) analyze a model of political contributions with the opposite timing of moves from
ours. That is, the lobbyists first make offers that specify the amount of contribution for each pol-
icy positions, and then the politicians choose policies. In their model, two motives for lobbyists
making contributions coexist: what they call the electoral motive (contributions affect winning
probabilities) and the influence motive (contributions affect the policy positions). Since lobby-
ists in our model make contributions only after policy positions are set, our model isolates the
electoral motive. In our model, although there is no explicit contract that specifies the amount of
contributions contingent on policy positions, the existence of contributions indirectly affects the
choice of policy positions because candidates are forward-looking in choosing their positions. In
a citizen-candidate model, Felli and Merlo (2006) also consider contracts between lobbyists and
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politicians that specify, as in Grossman and Helpman (1996) a policy-contingent transfer. Al-
though the model is quite different, their results share some similarity to ours in that they show
lobbying induces some policy compromise. Zudenkova (2017) study the same timing structure
with endogenous formation of lobbyist groups and also shows that the competition among extreme
lobbies moderates the policy outcome.
A large strand of the literature specifies how candidates use campaign funds and thereby af-
fect voters’ behavior under various model specifications. For example, Coate (2004b) considers
a model in which political campaigns provide information about the policy positions of policy-
motivated candidates and shows that, even in equilibrium, voters are uncertain about the candi-
dates’ positions. Bailey (2002) assumes that one candidate chooses the policy position prior to the
other, and that contributions can be used to target the campaign at selected people.7 Potters et al.
(1997) and Prat (2002a,b) consider the situations in which campaign contributions are used to sig-
nal the candidates’ valence. Morton and Myerson (2012) consider a model in which candidates use
the raised funds to provide a promised service to the voters. In contrast to the models considered
in the papers mentioned here, our model considers how interest groups adjust the amount of their
campaign contributions and how politicians react to such incentives while abstracting away from
the consideration regarding how funds are used.
Implications similar to our extreme dominance are obtained in different models. First, Hilman
and Riley (1989) model the lobbying process as an all-pay auction and show that only two highest-
value lobbyists actively compete (see also Baye et al., 1993). The difference is that the values from
winning the auction are exogenously fixed in their model, whereas the lobbyists’ benefits from
contribution are endogenously determined by the candidates’ policy choice in our model. Second,
Osborne et al. (2000) and Bulkey et al. (2001) consider a model where players decide whether to
pay a cost and attend a meeting whose outcome is a compromise (such as median or mean) of
the participants’ bliss points (so there are no players who correspond to our candidates). In their
7Schultz (2007) also discusses such targeting.
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model, only players with extreme preferences participate in equilibrium. Bergstrom et al. (1986)
also make similar points in the context of public good provision.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the basic model. Sections 3 is devoted
to the analysis of the model. Section 3.1 analyzes the case with concave lobbyist utilities and
shows that extremist dominance and policy convergence hold in any equilibrium. Section 3.2
proves equilibrium existence. Section 4 concludes and provides various discussions. Appendix
A extends the analysis to the case with mixed strategies, and Appendices B, C, and D analyze,
respectively, the models with informed voters, with policy-motivated candidates and with convex
lobbyist utilities.
2 Model
Consider the following election game played by two candidates and n lobbyists with n ≥ 2. Each
candidate, i ∈ {A,B}, is purely office-motivated. That is, the candidates want to maximize their
own winning probability, which is determined by their campaign expenditure. Electoral campaigns
need to be funded by the political contributions from the lobbyists, and each candidate commits
to her policy so as to attract campaign funds. Each lobbyist, k ∈ N := {1, . . . ,n}, is purely policy-
motivated in the sense that he cares only about the realized policy but not the identity of the winning
candidate.
More precise rules of the game are as follows. The game consists of two stages. In stage 1,
each candidate i simultaneously chooses her policy commitment xi ∈R. In stage 2, after observing
(xA,xB), each lobbyist k simultaneously determines ck = (ckA,ckB), where cki ≥ 0 is k’s contribu-
tion to candidate i. The election campaign and the election take place after all those choices are
made. During the campaign, each candidate i spends ci = ∑k∈N cki. Candidate i’s probability of
winning in the election is given by Pi(cA,cB), where Pi : R2+ → [0,1] is a partially differentiable
function that is nondecreasing in ci and satisfies Pi(cA,cB) ≥ 0 and PA(cA,cB) +PB(cA,cB) = 1
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for any pair (cA,cB) ∈ R2+. Note that we assume the winning probabilities depend only on the
sum of contributions for each candidate. In particular, it does not depend on the identities of the
contributors.
Under the outcome ((xA,xB),(c1, . . . ,cn)), the payoffs of the players are specified as follows.
Candidate i’s payoff is 1 if elected and 0 otherwise. Lobbyist k’s expected payoff is
Uk((xA,xB),(c1, . . . ,cn)) := (PA(cA,cB)uk(xA)+PB(cA,cB)uk(xB))− (ckA+ ckB),
where uk(x) is k’s utility from policy x in monetary terms. We assume that the function uk :R→R
is strictly concave and differentiable, satisfying u′k(ak) = 0, where ak ∈ R is interpreted to be k’s
ideal policy (or, bliss point).8 Notice that argmaxx∈R uk(x) = {ak}. The lobbyists are labeled so
that a1 < · · · < an and we refer to lobbyists 1 and n as extreme.9 We further assume that uk’s
satisfy the standard “single-crossing" property: ∂uk∂x <
∂uk′
∂x if k < k
′. A leading example is the case
in which uk is identical across k except for the bliss points, i.e., uk(x) = u(x−ak) for each k.
In this game, a pure strategy profile is given by ((xA,xB),(κ1(·), . . . ,κn(·))) where (i) xi ∈
R denotes candidate i’s policy choice, (ii) κk(x˜A, x˜B) for each (x˜A, x˜B) ∈ R2 denotes lobbyist k’s
contribution amount contingent on policy profile (x˜A, x˜B). In the next section, we consider subgame
perfect equilibria (SPEs) in pure strategies of the above specified game. In Appendix A, we
formalize mixed-strategies and show that every mixed-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium is in
pure strategies under certain regularity conditions.
8The concavity of uk(·) is critical for the results. It is technically challenging to analyze the case of convex uk(·)
in general, because an equilibrium may not exist in pure strategies. We, however, provide some results for a certain
special case in Appendix D. Differentiability of uk is, however, not crucial under the assumption of concavity. Without
differentiability, we would only need to redefine aM (defined before Proposition 2) and slightly modify related analyses
accordingly. We also note that the linearity of Uk with respect to the spending, although standard in the literature, is
important for extremist dominance. However, one can show that the most extreme lobbyist contributes the most
whenever Uk is a weakly concave (and decreasing) function of the spending.
9Here we assume that no two lobbyists have the same bliss point. This assumption is made only to simplify the
argument, and none of our results hinges on this assumption.
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3 Analysis
3.1 Properties of Pure-Strategy Equilibrium
In this section, we investigate the properties of SPEs. We are going to establish the existence in
the next subsection with certain additional assumptions.
The first proposition shows that, in any subgame of any SPE, only the extreme lobbyists make
positive amounts of contribution. The intuition for this result is as follows (refer back to Figure
1). Fixing a subgame, the only lobbyist who can possibly make a contribution to candidate i in
any SPE is the one who perceives the highest utility difference for i over −i. This is because the
marginal benefit from contribution is the highest for such a lobbyist. The single-crossing condition
implies that it is either lobbyist 1 or n who perceives the highest utility difference.
Proposition 1 (Extremist Dominance). For any subgame, if a lobbyist donates a strictly positive
amount, then that lobbyist must be extreme. Formally, fix a subgame after (xA,xB)with xA≤ xB, and
suppose that (c∗k)k∈N is a (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium in this subgame. Then, c
∗
ki = 0 for all
(k, i) 6∈ {(1,A),(n,B)}. Symmetrically, c∗ki = 0 for all (k, i) 6∈ {(1,B),(n,A)} in any (pure-strategy)
Nash equilibrium of any subgame after (xA,xB) with xA ≥ xB.
Proof. To begin, notice that the claim trivially holds if xA = xB, because if so, there is a unique
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, in which all lobbyists make zero contribution to each candidate.
We provide the proof only for the case of xA < xB, as the other case is perfectly symmetric.
Fix (xA,xB) with xA < xB and a Nash equilibrium after (xA,xB), denoted by (c∗k)k∈N . First, we
establish that lobbyist k contributes a positive amount to candidate i only when k has the largest
utility gain from i winning over j; i.e.,
c∗ki > 0 =⇒ k ∈ argmax
`∈N
[
u`(xi)−u`(x j)
]
, for each k ∈ N and i ∈ {A,B}, (1)
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where j ∈ {A,B}−{i}. To see this, suppose that c∗ki > 0. Then, by the first-order condition,
∂Uk((xA,xB),(c∗`)`∈N)
∂cki
= (uk(xi)−uk(x j)) · ∂Pi(c
∗
A,c
∗
B)
∂ci
−1 = 0.
Since ∂Pi(c
∗
A,c
∗
B)
∂ci
≥ 0 by assumption, uk(xi)−uk(x j)> 0 and ∂Pi(c
∗
A,c
∗
B)
∂ci
> 0 must hold. Hence, if there
exists k′ ∈ N such that uk′(xi)−uk′(x j)> uk(xi)−uk(x j), then, we have
∂Uk′((xA,xB),(c∗`)`∈N)
∂ck′i
= (uk′(xi)−uk′(x j)) ·
∂Pi(c∗A,c
∗
B)
∂ci
−1> 0.
Therefore, by the definition of partial derivatives, there exists ε > 0 such that
Uk′((xA,xB),(c
∗
k′+ ε,(c
∗
`) 6`=k′))>Uk′((xA,xB),(c
∗
`)`∈N),
which is a contradiction to the supposition that (c∗`)`∈N is a Nash equilibrium.
Now, it suffices to establish that argmax`∈N
[
u`(xi)−u`(x j)
]
is equal to {1} for i = A and to
{n} for i = B. To show this, fix two lobbyists k̂ and k˜ such that k̂ < k˜. Then the single-crossing
property of u`’s implies
[uk̂(xB)−uk̂(xA)]− [uk˜(xB)−uk˜(xA)]< 0,
which leads to
uk̂(xA)−uk̂(xB)> uk˜(xA)−uk˜(xB).
This implies argmax`∈N [u`(xA)−u`(xB)] is equal to {1}. A symmetric argument shows that
argmax`∈N [u`(xB)−u`(xA)] is equal to {n}, and thus the proof is complete. 
The second proposition shows that policies converge on the path of play of any pure-strategy
SPE. In order to rule out some uninteresting indeterminacy, we hereafter assume that if xi < x j < a1
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or an < x j < xi with i 6= j, then the contribution amount from any lobbyist is zero for both candi-
dates and candidate j wins with probability 1. Let us further impose the following assumptions on
(PA,PB).
Assumption 1. For any c≥ 0, PA(c,c) = PB(c,c).10
Assumption 2. If ci ≥ c j, then ∂Pi/∂ci ≤ ∂Pj/∂c j.
Assumption 3. ∂Pi/∂ci = ∞ at c = (0,0).11
Assumption 1 is the symmetry between the candidates. Assumption 2 states that an additional
unit of campaign spending is weakly less effective for a candidate who spends more than the other.
Assumption 3 rules out corner solutions. Notice that the commonly-used Tullock function, Pi(c) =
cri/(c
r
A+ c
r
B) if c 6= (0,0) and Pi(0,0) = 1/2, satisfies all these assumptions. The assumptions are
also satisfied by Hirshleifer’s (1989) “difference form" of contest success functions that depends
only on the difference of contributions, so there exists a function Q :R→ [0,1] such that Pi(ci,c j)=
Q(ci− c j), provided that Q′(0) = ∞.
Let aM ∈ (a1,an) be the unique solution of the equation u′1(aM) =−u′n(aM). That is, aM is the
policy position such that the two extreme lobbyists perceive the same magnitude of utility differ-
ence for a marginal change in policy. Note that aM exists because differentiability and concavity
of u1 and un implies that these functions are also continuously differentiable.
Proposition 2 (Policy Convergence). Suppose that Assumptions 1–3 hold. Then, policies converge
in any SPE. Formally, if ((x∗A,x
∗
B),(κ∗1 (·), . . . ,κ∗n (·))) is a pure-strategy SPE, then x∗A = x∗B = aM
holds.
Proof. Fix (xA,xB) such that xi = aM 6= x j and a Nash equilibrium (c∗k)k∈N in the subgame after
(xA,xB). It suffices to show that i’s winning probability is strictly higher than 1/2. Without loss of
10In fact, it suffices to assume Pi(c,c) = Pi(c′,c′) for any c,c′ ≥ 0 for each i = A,B (not necessarily requiring sym-
metry across candidates) to prove the results in this paper. For simplicity, however, we stick to the current Assumption
1.
11The infinite partial derivative is defined in the standard manner: ∂Pi/∂ci =∞ at (ci,c−i) if limε→0 Pi(ci+ε,c−i)ε =∞.
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generality, suppose xA = aM < xB. Towards a contradiction, suppose that c∗A ≤ c∗B. By Proposition
1 we have c∗A = c
∗
1A and c
∗
B = c
∗
nB. Further, c
∗
B > 0 must hold since c
∗
A+ c
∗
B > 0 by Assumption 3.
Therefore, the first-order condition for the optimality of c∗nB can be written as
∂Un((aM,xB),(c∗k)k∈N)
∂cnB
= [un(xB)−un(aM)] · ∂PB(c
∗
A,c
∗
B)
∂cB
−1 = 0.
Since ∂PB(c
∗
A,c
∗
B)
∂cB
≥ 0 by assumption, un(xB)−un(aM)> 0 and ∂PB(c
∗
A,c
∗
B)
∂cB
> 0 must hold. This implies,
however,
∂U1((aM,xB),(c∗k)k∈N)
∂c1A
= [u1(aM)−u1(xB)] · ∂PA(c
∗
A,c
∗
B)
∂cA
−1> 0, (2)
because (i) the strict concavity of uk(·)’s and the definition of aM imply
u1(aM)−u1(xB)> u′1(aM)(aM− xB)
= u′n(a
M)(xB−aM)> un(xB)−u(aM)> 0,
and (ii) Assumption 2 and the supposition of c∗A ≤ c∗B entail ∂PA(c
∗
A,c
∗
B)
∂cA
≥ ∂PB(c∗A,c∗B)∂cB > 0. Equation
(2) means that lobbyist 1 has an incentive to marginally increase his contribution to candidate A,
which is a contradiction to the assumption that (c∗k)k∈N is a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, we must
have c∗A > c
∗
B and hence PA(c
∗)> PB(c∗) because of Assumption 1 and
∂PB(c∗A,c
∗
B)
∂cB
> 0. This implies
that PA(c∗)> 12 and the proof is complete. 
Note that the equilibrium policy, x∗A = x
∗
B = a
M, depends only on the preferences of the extrem-
ists but not of the other lobbyists. This is because, given extremist dominance, candidates only
care about the potential contributions from lobbyists 1 and n. Given that only lobbyists 1 and n
are relevant for the policy choices, let us now explain why it is at aM that the equilibrium policies
converge. If aM = xA < xB, the definition of aM and the strict concavity of lobbyist utility func-
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tions imply that lobbyist 1 experiences a larger utility difference between the two candidates than
lobbyist n does. With our assumptions, this leads candidate A to receive more contributions and to
have a greater chance to win. In other words, aM is a Condorcet winner and thus, in equilibrium
both candidates take that policy.
Taking the two propositions together, we obtain the following result. We will comment on this
property of the SPE in Section 4.12
Corollary 1. On the equilibrium path of play of any pure-strategy SPE, no lobbyist contributes to
any candidate.
3.2 Equilibrium Existence
In this section, we establish the existence of a pure-strategy SPE under mild technical conditions.
First, given the proof of Proposition 2, it suffices to establish the existence in the second-stage
subgames.
Lemma 1. If Assumptions 1–3 hold and a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists for each second-
stage subgame, then a pure-strategy SPE exists.
Proof. By supposition, there exists (κ1(·), . . . ,κn(·)) that induces a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
in each second stage subgame. Given any such (κ1(·), . . . ,κn(·)), the proof of Proposition 2 shows
that i’s winning probability is strictly lower than 1/2 whenever xi 6= aM = x j. Therefore, taking
the lobbyists’ strategies (κ1(·), . . . ,κn(·)) and the other candidate j’s position x j = aM as given,
choosing xi = aM is a best response for candidate i. That is,
(
(aM,aM),(κ1(·), . . . ,κn(·))
)
is a
pure-strategy SPE and hence, a pure-strategy SPE exists. 
Second, the following regularity assumptions are sufficient for the existence of a Nash equilib-
rium in each subgame.
12This result parallels that of Ledyard’s (1984) although he studies a quite different context. In his model, candidates
choose their policy positions, and then voters make abstention decisions. In the “strong rational election equilibrium"
that he defines, policies converge and, as a consequence, no one votes.
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Assumption 4. Each Pi(·, ·) is (jointly) continuous.
Assumption 5. Each Pi is weakly concave in ci.
Proposition 3. All second-stage subgames have a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies if Assump-
tions 4– 5 hold. If Assumptions 1–5 hold , hence, an SPE exists in pure strategies.
Proof. Given Lemma 1, it suffices to show the first part of the claim. To do so, fix an arbitrary
(xA,xB). First notice that for lobbyist k, if uk(xi)≥ uk(x j) with i 6= j, then any contribution amount
ck j > 0 is strictly dominated by the contribution amount ck j = 0. Hence, each lobbyist k contributes
a positive amount to at most one candidate in any Nash equilibrium of the subgame after (xA,xB),
and the identity of the candidate to whom lobbyist k contributes a positive amount does not depend
on other lobbyists’ strategies. For each lobbyist k, let ι(k) be the candidate i satisfying uk(xi) >
uk(x j) if such i exists and let ι(k) = A if uk(xA) = uk(xB). The preceding argument implies that
it is without loss of generality to regard each lobbyist’s action to be a nonnegative scalar, i.e.,
ckι(k) ∈ R+. Now, define U¯ := maxk∈N |uk(xA)− uk(xB)| < ∞. Since no lobbyist has an incentive
to make a contribution greater than U¯ , it is without loss of generality to restrict the action space for
each lobbyist to [0,U¯ ] in this subgame. With these transformations, each Uk is continuous in ckι(k)
by Assumption 4 and is quasi-concave in ckι(k) by Assumption 5. Hence, the theorems by Debreu
(1952), Glicksberg (1952), and Fan (1952) guarantee the existence of an equilibrium.13 
Notice that the Tullock function violates Assumption 4, for it is discontinuous at the origin.
However, as in the standard Tullock models, a pure-strategy equilibrium can be shown to exist in
each subgame with the Tullock Pi function as long as r≤ 2 holds. Thus, even for such Pi functions,
the results in Propositions 1 and 2 are relevant.
13Debreu (1952), Glicksberg (1952), and Fan (1952) show that any normal-form game whose action spaces are
nonempty compact convex subsets of a Euclidian space with payoff functions that are quasi-concave on each player’s
action space and are jointly continuous on the space of action profiles has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
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4 Discussions
We considered a two-candidate election model in which candidates set their policies first and then
lobbyists contribute, which in turn determines the winning probabilities. Under the assumption of
concave lobbyist utility functions, only extreme lobbyists can contribute in any Nash equilibrium
of the subgame after any policy profile on and off the equilibrium path of play, and the policies
converge. As a consequence, no lobbyists contribute to any candidate on the equilibrium path.
Let us conclude by making a comment on the interpretation of our contribution. The SPE
outcome of our model that no lobbyists contribute apparently contradicts the reality in which cam-
paign contributions do exist. We would not necessarily interpret such discrepancy between the
outcome of the model and the reality as a weakness of the model, but as a benchmark for under-
standing the drivers of campaign contributions.14 Specifically, we interpret this discrepancy as
suggesting that perhaps some other components that we do not model are the key drivers of cam-
paign contributions. Let us consider four possibilities of such missing drivers and discuss whether
and how they change the insights from our baseline model.
Informed voters: First, one may wonder whether our conclusions depend on our assumption
that the winning probabilities depend only on campaign contributions, and in particular how they
would change if we introduce informed voters who respond to the implemented policy as in Baron
(1994). In Appendix B, we discuss a model in which the winning probability depends not only on
the contribution profile but also on the policy profile. We show that policy convergence holds under
certain natural assumptions on how the policy profile affects the winning probability, although the
convergent point may be different from the one in our baseline model.
14This is in the same spirit as how one would interpret Hotelling’s convergence result: it is a useful benchmark even
though it does not necessarily fit the reality.
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Restricted policy space: Second, there may be various constraints on part of candidates that
prevent them from freely choosing their policy positions. For instance, a Republican candidate
may be constrained not to announce a radically liberal policy. In such a situation, policy divergence
may occur in the policy-setting stage, and if that happens then the campaign contributions would
take place in our model. More specifically, we can show that even if the candidates’ choice sets
are exogenously restricted while being convex and disjoint, each candidate would try to move
as close as possible to the other candidate, which is analogous to our policy convergence result.15
Furthermore, our extremist dominance result would be helpful in identifying who would be making
contributions when policies diverge.16 The proof of extremist dominance also suggests that, with
additional technical assumptions on the Pi function, we would obtain positive correlations between
the contribution amounts and the degree of policy divergence.
Policymotivated candidates: Third, candidates may receive utility from the policy implemented
by the winning candidate. In Appendix C, we present a model where each candidate gains some
utility from the implemented policy, in addition to the utility from being elected. There, we show
that a unique policy profile emerging from any pure-strategy SPE exhibits divergence if and only if
the weight on the policy preferences (relative to the weight on the utility from winning the election)
is above some cutoff level. Moreover, when the weight is above the cutoff, the divergence and the
total amount of contributions are increasing in that weight, as well as in the degree of divergence
of the extreme lobbyists’ bliss points and that of the candidates’ bliss points.
Furthermore, we extend the model to allow for caps on contribution amounts, and find an
interesting role that contribution caps can play. Specifically, we show that once a sufficiently tight
15The proof is analogous to the one for Proposition 2. To gain some intuition, refer back to Figure 2.
16One may criticize extremist dominance on the basis of multiple interest groups contributing to a single party in
reality. This is again a discrepancy that future research could address. One possibility for avoiding such an outcome
would be to assume that each lobbyist is budget-constrained. In such a model, multiple extreme lobbyists from each
side would make a positive amount of contributions, and policy would still converge. Another possibility would be that
the policy space is multi-dimensional, and each policy issue (corresponding to each dimension of the policy space) is
associated with multiple lobbyists. In such a case, only two lobbyists from each dimension would make a contribution
in any subgame, but the overall number of lobbyists making positive contributions would be greater.
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cap is imposed, there is no pure-strategy SPE in which the contribution amount is zero no matter
how small the weight on the policy preferences is. This is in a stark contrast with our result that,
when there is no cap, the contribution amount is zero in the unique pure-strategy SPE if the weight
on the policy preferences is small enough. Moreover, when sufficiently tight caps are imposed,
we show that there is a mixed-strategy SPE in which the contribution amount is strictly positive
with strictly positive probability.17 These results shed new light on the discussion on the role of
contribution caps, which have been long argued in the literature (see, e.g., Levitt (1994) and Coate
(2004a)).
Convex lobbyist utility: Fourth, our analysis depends on the shape of the utility function of the
interest groups, and it is not our purpose to argue that concave utility functions are more plausible
than others. Rather, by examining various preferences, we would like to offer an understanding of
the role of contributions in determining electoral outcomes. In Appendix D, we supplement our
analysis by examining how our result changes when we consider other sorts of utility functions.
Specifically, we consider the case where the utilities are single-peaked and are convex with respect
to the distance between the bliss point and the implemented policy.18 In such a context, we still
obtain policy convergence (albeit to a different position) and no contributions unless a certain
strong symmetry condition on the lobbyist utility function holds. This suggests that changing the
shape of utility functions would not be very helpful in avoiding the non-contribution result.
As we have discussed above, there are many ways to modify the baseline model to examine
various forces in elections and their implications. Although the no-contribution result is not ob-
tained in some of those variants, the economic force that generates the extreme dominance and
policy convergence in the baseline model continues to play a key role: Each lobbyist solves their
17There may not exist any pure-strategy SPE when the weight on the policy preferences is small.
18Such preferences may seem unusual at first glance, but in certain contexts they may even be more natural than other
specifications. Again, we do not intend to justify any particular types of preferences. We refer interested readers to
Osborne (1995) and Kamada and Kojima (2014) for extensive discussion on the contexts in which convexity naturally
arise.
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maximization problem taking into account the fact that other lobbyists are facing similar problems,
and a candidate’s move to an extreme lobbyist not only increases contributions from that lobbyist
but also increases contributions from the opposing lobbyist to the opposing candidate. This force
prevents the candidates diverging to the opposing extremes.
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APPENDICES
A Mixed Strategies
In this section, we introduce mixed strategies and show that every SPE is in pure strategies once
we slightly strengthen Assumption 5 to the following:
Assumption 6. Each Pi is strictly concave in ci.
That is, it is almost without any loss of generality that we restrict our attention to pure-strategy
SPEs in the main body of the paper.
Let ξi denote candidate i’s mixed strategy, specifying a Borel measure over the policy positions
in R. Also, let γk(xA,xB) denote lobbyist k’s mixed strategy contingent on policy profile (xA,xB),
specifying a Borel measure over the contribution amounts in R2+. A mixed strategy profile is given
by ((ξA,ξB),(γ1(·), . . . ,γn(·))). With the specifications so far, the expected payoff to each player
at each subgame of the entire game is well-defined, and thus a mixed-strategy subgame perfect
equilibrium (SPE) is defined in the standard manner.
The next proposition shows that, under Assumption 6 along with Assumptions 1–4, any SPE in
mixed strategies should be indeed in pure strategies. In other words, the policy convergence result
in Proposition 2 extends to mixed strategies. The proof first shows that in any SPE, the second-
stage strategies have to be pure. To show this, we observe that every lobbyist contributes to at most
one candidate, and the strict concavity of Pi ensures that the contribution amount is deterministic.
To further show that the first-stage strategies are pure, we show that aM is the Condorcet winner.
Proposition 4. Suppose that Assumptions 1–4 and Assumption 6 hold. Then any SPE must be
in pure strategies. Hence, if ((ξA,ξB),(γ1(·), . . . ,γn(·))) is a mixed-strategy SPE, then ξA(aM) =
ξB(aM) = 1 and, for each k∈N and (xA,xB)∈R2, there exists ck ∈R2+ such that γk(xA,xB)(ck) = 1.
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Proof. Fix any lobbyist k. We check that under Assumption 6, k’s best reply must be a pure
strategy for any (xA,xB) and any profile of mixed strategies played by lobbyists ` 6= k. First,
if uk(xA) = uk(xB), (ckA,ckB) = 0 is a strictly dominant strategy for k and hence, k’s best reply
must be a pure strategy. Second, suppose that uk(xA) > uk(xB). Then it is apparent that k has no
incentive to make a positive contribution to B and hence, k’s best reply must choose ckB = 0 with
probability one. In addition, given ckB = 0 and the mixed strategies played by the other lobbyists,
k’s optimization problem is given by
max
ckA∈[0,U¯ ]
{
E
[
PA
(
ckA+ ∑`
6=k
c`A, ∑`
6=k
c`B
)]
uk(xA)+E
[
PB
(
ckA+ ∑`
6=k
c`A, ∑`
6=k
c`B
)]
uk(xB)− ckA
}
,
where U¯ :=maxk∈N |uk(xA)−uk(xB)|<∞ and the expectations are taken with respect to the mixed
strategies of ` 6= k. By Assumption 6, the objective function is strictly concave with respect to ckA ∈
[0,U¯ ] and hence, the problem has a unique maximizer c∗kA and k’s best reply must be (ckA,ckB) =
(c∗kA,0). The case of uk(xA)< uk(xB) is perfectly symmetric. In sum, any best reply of any lobbyist
must be a pure strategy and hence, any mixed-strategy equilibrium of any second stage subgame
must be in pure strategies.19
Now we show that first-stage actions in any SPE are also pure. Towards a contradiction, fixing
a (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium of each of the second-stage subgames, suppose that candidate i
chooses xi = aM with a probability strictly smaller than one. Then, by the arguments in the proof
of Proposition 2, the other candidate j can guarantee a winning probability strictly greater than
1/2 by taking x j = aM with probability one. Therefore, if i’s strategy is a part of an equilibrium,
then i’s winning probability should be strictly smaller than 1/2. However, i can also guarantee a
winning probability weakly greater than 1/2 by picking xi = aM with probability one, which is a
19This follows because there does not exist a mixed-strategy equilibrium that assigns strictly positive probability to
contribution amounts in (U¯ ,∞). To see this, suppose that in a Nash equilibrium in the subgame after some (xA,xB),
lobbyist k uses a mixed strategy µ such that µ([0,U¯ ]2) < 1. Then, given any strategies of other lobbyists, it is
straightforward to see that deviating to another mixed strategy µ ′ strictly improves k’s payoff in this subgame, where
µ ′(Q) = µ(Q) for any measurable Q⊆ [0,U¯ ]2 \{(0,0)} and µ ′({0,0}) = 1−µ([0,U¯ ]2 \{(0,0)}).
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contradiction. 
B Model with Informed Voters
In this section, we consider a model in which the winning probability is determined not only by the
contributions by lobbyists but also by how voters respond to the policy positions. Specifically, sup-
pose that when the contribution profile is (cA,cB) and the policy profile is (xA,xB), each candidate
i’s winning probability is given by
Ri(cA,cB,xA,xB) = (1−θ)Pi(cA,cB)+θQi(xA,xB),
where θ ∈ [0,1), the function Pi is defined as in our main model, and Qi is a continuous function
satisfying the following properties.
1. There exists a unique aV ∈ (a1,an) such that the following hold: If xA ≤ aV ≤ xB (resp.
if xA ≥ aV ≥ xB), then there exists x′A ∈ [aV ,xB] and x′B ∈ [xA,aV ] (resp. x′A ∈ [xB,aV ] and
x′B ∈ [aV ,xA]) such that QA(x′A,xB)≥ QA(xA,xB) and QB(xA,x′B)≥ QB(xA,xB).
2. For each i, j ∈ {A,B} with i 6= j, Qi(xA,xB) is nonincreasing in xi over (x j,∞) if aV ≤ x j, and
Qi(xA,xB) is nondecreasing in xi over (−∞,x j) if x j ≤ aV .
3. QA(xA,xB)+QB(xA,xB) = 1 for any (xA,xB) ∈ R2.
A possible interpretation of the above Ri functions is as follows: With probability 1−θ the vot-
ers are not well informed about the manifests, and respond only to the campaign expenditure (e.g.,
the amount of advertisements), which is financed by the contributions from the lobbyists. Thus the
winning probability only depends on the contribution profile (cA,cB) in this case. With probability
θ , the voters are well informed, respond to the policy profile, and the winning probability only
depends on the policy profile (xA,xB).
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To introduce examples of Qi satisfying the above conditions, let f be a function such that
f (x)> 0 over some nonempty interval V in R and
∫
x∈V f (x)dx = 1. In any of these examples, aV
is given by the unique solution to
∫ aV
−∞ f (x)dx = 1/2.
1. A mass of voters are distributed over V according to density f and each voter votes for the
closer candidate, while an indifferent voter votes for each candidate with probability 1/2.
For any given policy profile (xA,xB), let Qi(xA,xB) = 1 if i attracts strictly more than 1/2
of the voters, Qi(xA,xB) = 1/2 if i attracts exactly 1/2 of the voters, and Qi(xA,xB) = 0 if i
attracts strictly less than 1/2 of the voters.
2. The median voter is distributed over V according to the probability density f (x) and the
candidate closer to the median voter wins while if the two candidates have the same distance
then each wins with probability 1/2. The function Qi denotes the wining probability con-
ditional on voters being informed. Specifically, if xA < xB, QA(xA,xB) =
∫ xA+xB
2−∞ f (x)dx =
1−QB(xA,xB). If xA = xB, then QA(xA,xB) = QB(xA,xB) = 1/2. The case with xB < xA is
symmetric.
3. The above two examples involve discontinuity of Q at xA = xB. To define an example of
continuous Q, let Q¯ be the function defined to be Q in the second example. Then, de-
fine QA(xA,xB) = (1− e−
1
|xA−xB| )12 + e
− 1|xA−xB| Q¯A(xA,xB) = 1−QB(xA,xB) if xA 6= xB and
QA(xA,xB) = QB(xA,xB) = 1/2 if xA = xB.
For the sake of simplicity, we further assume that Pi(cA,cB) = ci/(cA+cB) for each i ∈ {A,B},
with a convention of 00+0 =
1
2 . Note that with this Tullock from, Assumptions 1–3 are met and
hence Proposition 1 holds. When a1 < xA < xB < an (i.e., when lobbyists 1 and n donate to
candidates A and B, respectively), the first-order conditions for the lobbyists imply that
c∗A
c∗A+ c
∗
B
=
u1(xA)−u1(xB)
[u1(xA)−u1(xB)]+ [un(xB)−un(xA)] , (3)
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where (c∗A,c
∗
B) = (c
∗
1A,c
∗
nB) is the (unique) profile of equilibrium funds raised by the candidates.
This explicit solution makes it easy to examine the changes in Pi when we analyze the SPE below.
Call the model we have specified above the model with informed voters. The following result
shows that the introduction of informed voters (as is done in this section) does not lead to policy
divergence.
Proposition 5. In the model with informed voters, if ((x∗A,x
∗
B),(κ∗1 (·), . . . ,κ∗n (·))) is a pure-strategy
SPE, then x∗A = x
∗
B holds.
20
Proof. Fix a pure-strategy SPE and let P˜i(xA,xB) denote candidate i’s winning probability in the
subgame after (xA,xB). Let (x∗A,x
∗
B) be an SPE outcome and assume without loss that a
V < aM.
Suppose for contradiction that x∗A 6= x∗B. Without loss, we further assume x∗A < x∗B.
First, u1(x∗A) > u1(x
∗
B) and un(x
∗
A) < un(x
∗
B) must hold for the following reason. Suppose to-
wards a contradiction that u1(x∗A)≤ u1(x∗B). Then, no lobbyist donates to A and hence, P˜A(x∗A,x∗B) =
0. If aV ≤ x∗B, there exists by assumption xA ∈ [aV ,x∗B] such that QA(xA,x∗B)≥ QA(x∗A,x∗B). Further,
we must also have P˜A(xA,x∗B)> 0, as u1(xA)> u1(x∗B) if xA ∈ [aV ,x∗B) and P˜A(xA,x∗B) = 1/2 if xA =
x∗B. That is, A has an incentive to deviate to such xA if aV ≤ x∗B. If x∗B< aV , by the second assumption
on Qi and continuity, QA(x∗B,x∗B)≥ QA(x∗A,x∗B). Since we also have P˜A(x∗B,x∗B) = 1/2> P˜A(x∗A,x∗B),
A has an incentive to deviate to xA = x∗B if x∗B < aV . Therefore, we must have u1(x∗A) > u1(x
∗
B). A
symmetric argument implies that un(x∗A)< un(x
∗
B) holds as well. Note that these inequalities imply
that P˜A is given by equation (3). Further, this entails that P˜A(xA,x∗B) is increasing in xA over [x∗A,x
∗
B).
Now, we consider the following three (exhaustive) cases: Suppose first that x∗A < x
∗
B≤ aV . Then
A has an incentive to deviate to any xA ∈ (x∗A,x∗B) because P˜A(xA,x∗B)> P˜A(x∗A,x∗B) and QA(xA,x∗B)≥
QA(x∗A,x
∗
B). Note that the second inequality follows from the second assumption on the function
Qi. Suppose second that x∗A < a
V < x∗B. Then, the first assumption on Qi guarantees the existence
of x′A ∈ [aV ,x∗B] with QA(xA,x∗B) ≥ QA(x∗A,x∗B). If x′A < x∗B, A has an incentive to deviate to x′A
because P˜A(x′A,x
∗
B)> P˜A(x
∗
A,x
∗
B) as argued above. If x
′
A = x
∗
B, then there exists ε > 0 small enough
20Existence of the SPE would follow if we impose further assumptions on the Qi functions as for the Pi functions.
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such that A has an incentive to deviate to x′A− ε , because QA is assumed to be continuous and
P˜A(xA,x∗B) is increasing in xA over [x∗A,x
∗
B) as argued above. Suppose third that a
V ≤ x∗A < x∗B. Then
B has an incentive to deviate to any xB ∈ (x∗A,x∗B) because P˜B(x∗A,xB)> P˜B(x∗A,x∗B) and QB(x∗A,xB)≥
QB(x∗A,x
∗
B). Again, the second inequality follows from the second assumption on the function Qi.
Overall, it cannot be the case that x∗A < x
∗
B. In a symmetric manner, x
∗
B < x
∗
A cannot hold. Hence
x∗A = x
∗
B. 
C Model with Policy-Motivated Candidates
Here we consider a model with policy preferences. The model differs from the one in the baseline
model in three ways: lobbyists’ utility functions are assumed to be quadratic, the candidates’ pay-
offs vary with the implemented policy, and the winning probabilities are determined by the Tullock
function. Specifically, first, we assume lobbyist k’s utility function is given by uk = −m(x− ak)2
where x is the implemented policy (i.e., the policy committed by the winner of the election) and
m > 0 is a parameter. As in the main model, one can show extremist dominance holds, and thus
we will not discuss contributions from lobbyists 2, . . . ,n−1 hereafter. For simplicity, we assume
that there exists a ∈ R++ such that a1 =−a and an = a. Second, candidate A has a bliss point −b
and candidate B has a bliss point b> 0. We assume that candidates are less extreme than the most
extreme lobbyists, i.e., b < a. Candidate A receives utility 1 upon winning an election, and loses
k(x− (−b))2 where x is the implemented policy and k > 0 is a parameter. Similarly, candidate B
receives utility 1 upon winning an election, and loses k(x−b)2. Third, if candidates A and B collect
contributions cA and cB, respectively, then A’s winning probability is
cA
cA+cB
, with a convention of
0
0+0 =
1
2 . Call this model the model with policy-motivated candidates.
Proposition 6. In the model with policy-motivated candidates, there exists a unique pure-strategy
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SPE. Moreover, in the unique pure-strategy SPE ((x∗A,x
∗
B),(κ∗1 (·), . . . ,κ∗n (·))), the following holds:
−x∗A = x∗B = max
{
0,
ab− 14k
a+b
}
.
Proof. Suppose that (x∗A,x
∗
B) is the first-stage outcome of a pure-strategy equilibrium. First, we
show x∗A ≤ x∗B. Suppose the contrary, i.e., that x∗B < x∗A. Without loss of generality, suppose also
that x∗A + x
∗
B ≤ 0, which further implies that B’s winning probability is no more than 1/2.21 We
consider the following three (exhaustive) cases.
1. Suppose x∗A ≤−a. Then B’s winning probability is zero and A’s policy is implemented with
probability 1. Thus B can strictly increase his payoff by deviating to xB = x∗A, a contradiction.
2. Suppose −a < x∗A ≤ b. Then B can strictly increase his payoff by deviating to xB = x∗A as it
will weakly increase the winning probability and strictly increase the expected payoff from
the policy.
3. Suppose x∗A > b. In this case x
∗
B ≤−b must also hold because we have assumed x∗A+x∗B ≤ 0.
Then B can strictly increase his payoff by deviating to xB = b as it will strictly increase the
winning probability and strictly increase the expected payoff from the policy.
Second, we show that x∗A≤ b and−b≤ x∗B. To show x∗A≤ b, suppose to the contrary that x∗A > b.
Then, since x∗A ≤ x∗B, candidate B’s winning probability is weakly less than 12 . By symmetry of the
utility function for policies, if candidate B deviates to xB = (x∗A + b)/2, her winning probability
strictly increases to a number above 12 and the expected utility from the implemented policy strictly
increases. Hence, we have x∗A ≤ b. In the symmetric manner, we can show that −b≤ x∗B.
Third, we show−b≤ x∗A and x∗B ≤ b. To see this, suppose to the contrary that x∗A <−b. Recall-
ing we have established that −b≤ x∗B, we have x∗A < x∗B. If −b< x∗B, A’s winning probability given
21By the symmetry of the model, if (x∗A,x
∗
B) is an equilibrium outcome, (xA,xB) = (−x∗B,−x∗A) is also an equilibrium
outcome. Therefore it is without loss to assume x∗A + x
∗
B ≤ 0. This inequality, together with xB < xA entails that
|u1(xA)−u1(xB)| ≤ |un(xA)−un(xB)| and hence, B’s winning probability is no more than 1/2.
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B’s policy x∗B is weakly increasing in xA over [x∗A,x
∗
B) 3 −b. If x∗B = −b, A’s winning probability
is less than 1/2 if she chooses xA = x∗A, while it is 1/2 if xA = −b. In either case, by deviating
to xA = −b, A can weakly increase her winning probability as well as strictly increase the payoff
upon winning. This is a contradiction. The symmetric argument can show x∗B ≤ b.
The arguments so far imply that we must have−b≤ x∗A≤ x∗B≤ b. From here on, we first restrict
our attention to (xA,xB) ∈ [−b,b]2 with xA ≤ xB to pin down a unique candidate for (x∗A,x∗B), and
then confirm that it is actually an equilibrium. To do so, we now analyze the second-stage and
compute the winning probability for each candidate, taking (xA,xB) ∈ [−b,b]2 as given. When the
candidates commit to (xA,xB) ∈ [−b,b]2 such that xA < xB (we will consider the case with xA = xB
later), lobbyist 1’s utility is
− cA
cA+ cB
m(xA+a)2− cBcA+ cB m(xB+a)
2− cA.
The first-order condition with respect to cA is
cB
(cA+ cB)2
(
m(xB+a)2−m(xA+a)2
)−1 = 0. (4)
Similarly, the first-order condition for lobbyist n is
cA
(cA+ cB)2
(
m(xA−a)2−m(xB−a)2
)−1 = 0.
These two equations imply that in the equilibrium of the subgame,
cA
cA+ cB
=
(xB+a)2− (xA+a)2
[(xB+a)2− (xA+a)2]+ [(xA−a)2− (xB−a)2] =
1
2
+
xB+ xA
4a
.
Given the above winning probability, we now investigate the equilibria of the first stage. Given
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a policy profile (xA,xB) ∈ [−b,b]2 such that xA < xB, candidate B’s payoff is
UB(xA,xB) =
(
1
2
− xA+ xB
4a
)
(1− k(b− xB)2)−
(
1
2
+
xA+ xB
4a
)
k(b− xA)2. (5)
This implies that
∂UB(xA,xB)
∂xB
=− 1
4a
(1− k(b− xB)2)+
(
1
2
− xA+ xB
4a
)
2k(b− xB)− 14ak(b− xA)
2. (6)
Substituting xB = b, the left-hand side of (6) becomes − 14a − 14ak(b− xA)2 < 0. Since UB(xA,xB)
is cubic in xB and the coefficient on xB is strictly positive by (5), either (i) UB(x∗A,xB) is strictly
decreasing in xB over (x∗A,b], or (ii) there exists a unique x
0
B ∈ (x∗A,b) such that the right hand side
of (6) is 0 and UB(x∗A,xB) is strictly increasing in xB over (x
∗
A,x
0
B] and strictly decreasing in xB over
[x0B,b]. In case (i), there is no best response to xA = x
∗
A for candidate B in (x
∗
A,b], a contradiction.
Hence the only possibility is case (ii), which implies that we must have x∗B = x0B. The symmetric
argument can be made for x∗A. Hence, if x
∗
A < x
∗
B, both the values of (6) and
∂UA(xA,xB)
∂xA
=
1
4a
(1− k(b+ xA)2)−
(
1
2
+
xA+ xB
4a
)
2k(xA+b)+
1
4a
k(b+ xB)2 (7)
must be equal to 0 at (xA,xB) = (x∗A,x
∗
B).
Adding the right-hand sides of (6) and (7) and rearranging, we have:
k
a
(xA+ xB)(xB− xA−a−b).
Substituting x∗A and x
∗
B into xA and xB, respectively, and equating the expression to zero, we get x
∗
B =
x∗A+a+b or x
∗
B =−x∗A. However, if x∗B = x∗A+a+b, then−b≤ x∗A implies x∗B≥−b+a+b= a> b,
which contradicts our earlier conclusion that x∗B ≤ b. Hence x∗B =−x∗A holds. Substituting this back
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into (6), we obtain
x∗B =
ab− 14k
a+b
≤ b. (8)
For this to satisfy x∗A < x
∗
B, it is necessary and sufficient that this is strictly positive, and for that,
k > 1/(4ab) is necessary and sufficient. That is, an SPE such that x∗A < x
∗
B can exist only if
k > 1/(4ab) holds, and the only candidate for such an equilibrium outcome is given by x∗A =−x∗B
and (8).
Next, consider the case where x∗A = x
∗
B. Suppose that x
∗
A = x
∗
B > 0. This is not an equilibrium
because candidate A can deviate to −x∗A to win with the same probability of 12 and to strictly
increase her expected payoff from the policy because x∗A ≤ b. Since the symmetric argument can
be made for x∗A = x
∗
B < 0, we have that x
∗
A = x
∗
B implies x
∗
A = x
∗
B = 0. For (x
∗
A,x
∗
B) = (0,0) to be an
equilibrium the value of (6) must be nonpositive, because otherwise B has an incentive to deviate
and marginally increase xB. Substituting (x∗A,x
∗
B) = (0,0) into (6), we obtain
∂UB(0,0)
∂xB
=− 1
4a
+ kb≤ 0,
which is equivalent to k≤ 1/(4ab). That is, an SPE such that x∗A = x∗B can exist only if k≤ 1/(4ab)
holds, and the only candidate for such an equilibrium outcome is x∗A = x
∗
B = 0.
Combining the conclusions in the previous two paragraphs, we have thus obtained a unique
candidate for a symmetric equilibrium,
−x∗A = x∗B = max
{
0,
ab− 14k
a+b
}
.
Now we show that this unique candidate is actually an equilibrium.
If k > 1/(4ab), then we know that {x∗B} = argmaxxB∈(x∗A,b]UB(x∗A,xB). Hence, to prove that
x∗B is a best response to x∗A, it suffices to check that candidate B has no incentive to deviate to
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xB ≤ x∗A or to b< xB. First, for any xB < x∗A, since x∗A < 0, B’s winning probability under (x∗A,xB) is
strictly less than 1/2. Since the utility from the policy conditional on winning is strictly less under
(x∗A,xB) than under (x
∗
A,x
∗
A), we have that UB(x
∗
A,xB) <UB(x
∗
A,x
∗
A) for any xB < x
∗
A. Since (x
∗
A,x
∗
A)
and (x∗A,x
∗
B) yield the same winning probability (i.e., 1/2) for candidate B while the latter gives
a strictly higher payoff from the expected policy, we have UB(x∗A,x
∗
A) < UB(x
∗
A,x
∗
B). Combining
the two inequalities, we conclude that UB(x∗A,xB) <UB(x
∗
A,x
∗
B) for any xB ≤ x∗A. Second, for any
xB > b, UB(x∗A,xB)<UB(x
∗
A,b) holds because the wining probability is strictly higher under (x
∗
A,b)
than under (x∗A,xB), and the utility from the policy conditional on winning is also strictly higher
under (x∗A,b) than under (x
∗
A,xB). That is, UB(x
∗
A,xB)<UB(x
∗
A,x
∗
B) for any xB > b. Overall, x
∗
B is a
best response to x∗A. By symmetry, we also have that x
∗
A is a best response to x
∗
B. Hence, (x
∗
A,x
∗
B) is
an equilibrium outcome of the first stage.
If k≤ 1/(4ab), then, given (x∗A,x∗B) = (0,0), equation (6) and the argument that follows it imply
that UB(x∗A,xB) is strictly decreasing in xB over (x
∗
A,b]. Moreover, since the winning probability
under policy profile (0,xB) is continuous at xB = 0, UB(0,xB) is continuous in xB at xB = 0, which
in turn implies that UB(x∗A,xB) is strictly decreasing in xB over [x
∗
A,b]. Hence, any deviation of
candidate B to xB ∈ (0,b] results in the decrease of the payoff. Also, as before, any deviation to
xB > b is strictly less profitable than the deviation to xB = b. Finally, any deviation to xB < 0
gives the same winning probability as and a strictly lower expected utility from the policy than the
deviation to x′B =−xB. Hence, (x∗A,x∗B) = (0,0) is an equilibrium outcome of the first stage. 
The above analysis has three implications. First, a sufficiently large weight on the policy pref-
erences (i.e., k> 1/(4ab)) is necessary for policy divergence in the unique symmetric equilibrium.
In other words, our prediction of policy convergence in the main model is robust for a small weight
on the policy preferences. Second, in equilibrium, the total amount of contribution positively cor-
relates with the degree of policy divergence. To see this, let c∗ = c∗A = c
∗
B and D
∗ = x∗B−x∗A = 2x∗B,
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where the latter represents the degree of policy divergence. Then equation (4) reduces to
1
4c∗
(
m
(
D∗
2
+a
)2
−m
(
−D
∗
2
+a
)2)
−1 = 0⇐⇒ c∗ = am
2
D∗.
Since am > 0, the contribution to each candidate (c∗) is strictly increasing in the degree of the
policy divergence (D∗) fixing a and m.22 Third, when k is sufficiently large, x∗B =
ab−(1/4k)
a+b is
strictly increasing in k, a, and b. Hence, the degree of policy divergence (D∗) is also increasing in
the weight on the candidates’ policy preferences (k), divergence of lobbyists’ bliss points (a), and
divergence of candidates’ bliss points (b). We summarize the finding in the following corollary.
Corollary 2. In the model with policy-motivated candidates, let ((x∗A,x
∗
B),(κ∗1 (·), . . . ,κ∗n (·))) be the
unique pure-strategy SPE and define D∗ = x∗B− x∗A and c∗ = c∗A = c∗B, where κ1(x∗A,x∗B) = (c∗A,0)
andκn(x∗A,x
∗
B) = (0,c
∗
B). Then we have the following:
1. D∗ = c∗ = 0 if k ≤ 14ab ,
2. c∗ = am2 D
∗ for any parameter values, and
3. both D∗ and c∗ are strictly in creasing in k, a, and b if k > 14ab .
Now we consider the possibility that there is an exogenously given contribution cap on the
amount that each lobbyist can spend. Let W ≥ 0 denote the cap. We assume that this cap applies to
both lobbyists, that is, cki ≤W must hold for any lobbyist k and candidate i.23 We show that once
a sufficiently tight cap is imposed, there is no pure-strategy SPE in which the contribution amount
is zero no matter how small the weight on the policy preferences is. This is in a stark contrast with
our result that, when there is no cap, the contribution amount is zero in the unique pure-strategy
SPE if the weight on the policy preferences is small enough. Moreover, we show the existence of
a mixed-strategy SPE. Combining these results, we have that in any SPE of the model with policy
22Note that the relationship c∗ = am2 D
∗ holds in the case k ≤ 1/(4ab) as well because c∗ = D∗ = 0.
23Since each lobbyist has an incentive to contribute to at most one candidate, the analysis will remain exactly the
same if we instead assume a cap in the form of ckA+ ckB ≤W .
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motivated candidates and a sufficiently tight contribution cap, the contribution amount is strictly
positive with strictly positive probability.
Proposition 7. In the model with policy-motivated candidates and contributions caps, a mixed-
strategy SPE exists. There is W ∗ > 0 such that for all W ∈ (0,W ∗), in any SPE ((ξA,ξB),(γ1,γn))
with W, the probability that both lobbyists pay a strictly positive contribution amount is strictly
positive.
Proof. First of all, it is without loss to assume that candidates assign probability zero to positions
outside [−a,a] because of our assumption for the cases of xi < x j < −a or xi > x j > a.24 Then
taking the contribution cap W as given, each subgame after (xA,xB) is a special case of the model
of Grossmann and Dietl (2012). For (xA,xB) ∈ [−a,a]2 such that xA ≤ xB and |xA| ≤ |xB|, the
equilibrium levels of contributions are given by
(
c∗1,A,c
∗
n,B
)
=

(
R1(xA,xB)2Rn(xA,xB)
(R1(xA,xB)+Rn(xA,xB))2
, R1(xA,xB)Rn(xA,xB)
2
(R1(xA,xB)+Rn(xA,xB))2
)
if W ≥ R1(xA,xB)2Rn(xA,xB)
(R1(xA,xB)+Rn(xA,xB))2
,(
W,
√
WRn(xA,xB)−W
)
if R1(xA,xB)
2Rn(xA,xB)
(R1(xA,xB)+Rn(xA,xB))2
>W ≥ Rn(xA,xB)4 , and
(W,W ) otherwise,
and consequently, the winning probabilities for the candidates are
(PA,PB) =

(
R1(xA,xB)
R1(xA,xB)+Rn(xA,xB)
, Rn(xA,xB)(R1(xA,xB)+Rn(xA,xB))
)
if W ≥ R1(xA,xB)Rn(xA,xB)2
(R1(xA,xB)+Rn(xA,xB))2
,(√
W/Rn(xA,xB), 1−
√
W/Rn(xA,xB)
)
if R1(xA,xB)
2Rn(xA,xB)
(R1(xA,xB)+Rn(xA,xB))2
>W ≥ Rn(xA,xB)4 , and
(1/2,1/2) otherwise,
where R1(xA,xB) = u1(xA)−u1(xB) and Rn(xA,xB) = un(xB)−un(xA).25 Note that R1 ≤ Rn under
the assumptions on (xA,xB). All the other cases of (xA,xB) are symmetric.
24Under our assumption, for any any xi 6∈ [−a,a] and x j ∈ R, there is x′i ∈ [−a,a] that gives candidate i a strictly
higher payoff than xi against candidate j’s x j.
25Note that R1(xA,xB)
2Rn(xA,xB)
(R1(xA,xB)+Rn(xA,xB))2
≥ Rn(xA,xB)4 holds whenever R1(xA,xB)≤ Rn(xA,xB).
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We first show that an SPE exists in mixed strategies, and then show that the probability that both
lobbyists pay a strictly positive contribution amount is strictly positive in any SPE. To show that an
SPE exists in mixed strategies, note that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in each subgame
played by the lobbyists, just as in the main text. Let Vi(xA,xB) be candidate i’s payoff function
given the policy profile (xA,xB), provided that the lobbyists play the unique Nash equilibrium in
the subgame after (xA,xB). First recall that we are considering a game in which each candidate
chooses a policy from [−a,a]. Second, note that each Vi is bounded and continuous except on the
subset {(xA,xB)|xA = xB}. Finally, note that for x≥ 0,
lim
xA↑x,xB↓x
VA(xA,xB)≥VA(x,x)≥ lim
xA↓x,xB↑x
VA(xA,xB) (9)
and
lim
xA↑x,xB↓x
VB(xA,xB)≤VB(x,x)≤ lim
xA↓x,xB↑x
VB(xA,xB) (10)
hold, where the left inequality in (9) is strict if and only if the left inequality in (10) is strict, and
the right inequality in (9) is strict if and only if the right inequality in (10) is strict. Also, for x< 0,
lim
xA↑x,xB↓x
VB(xA,xB)≥VB(x,x)≥ lim
xA↓x,xB↑x
VB(xA,xB) (11)
and
lim
xA↑x,xB↓x
VA(xA,xB)≤VA(x,x)≤ lim
xA↓x,xB↑x
VA(xA,xB) (12)
hold, where the left inequality in (11) is strict if and only if the left inequality in (12) is strict, and
the right inequality in (11) is strict if and only if the right inequality in (12) is strict. All in all,
the conditions for the existence of a mixed-strategy equilibrium in Dasgupta and Maskin (1986,
Theorem 5b) are satisfied. Hence, a mixed-strategy equilibrium exists in the game with payoff
functions (VA,VB). Therefore, an SPE exists in mixed strategies.
To show that the probability that both lobbyists pay a strictly positive contribution amount is
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strictly positive in any SPE, it is sufficient to show that there is W ∗ > 0 such that for all W ∈
(0,W ∗), there is no pure-strategy SPE in which both candidates choose the same policy. Towards
a contradiction, suppose that W < mb
2
4 , that such an SPE exists, and that the candidates choose
xA = xB = x with probability one on the equilibrium path of play. Suppose x≤ 0 so that R1(x,b)≥
u1(0)− u1(b) > mb2 and Rn(x,b) ≥ un(b)− un(0) = mb2. Then, since min
{
R1(x,b)
4 ,
Rn(x,b)
4
}
>
mb2
4 , candidate B’s winning probability is
1
2 if she deviates to policy b. Hence, the deviation to b
does not change the winning probability while strictly increasing the payoff upon winning. This
contradicts the assumption that both candidates choosing x with probability 1 is part of a SPE
strategy profile. Since the symmetric argument applies to the case when x≥ 0, we have proven the
desired result. 
D Convex Lobbyist Utility
As we saw in the main text, the concavity of lobbyists’ utility functions is a key to the policy
convergence result. Moreover, extremist dominance arises because the extremists perceive the
largest utility gaps between two policies, and this is because we assume the single crossing property
of the lobbyists’ utility functions. Note that, in the simple setting with uk(x) = u(x− ak) for
each k, strict concavity of u implies the single-crossing property. In order to better understand
the implication of concavity assumption on lobbyist preferences, here we examine convex utility
functions. The point of this exercise is not to argue for a particular assumption about lobbyist
preferences, but to better understand the roles of different assumptions about preferences of the
lobbyists.
Specifically, consider the “convex utility model" that is exactly the same as the one with mixed
strategies presented in Appendix A, except for the following three features. First, there exists
u :R→R such that, for each k ∈ N, uk(x) = u(x−ak). Second, u is decreasing and strictly convex
38
in the following sense: For any x,y ∈ R such that x · y> 0 and x> y,
(u(x)−u(y)) · x< 0 and u(αx+(1−α)y)< αu(x)+(1−α)u(y) for all α ∈ (0,1). (13)
That is, u is strictly convex in the standard sense on R+ and R− separately, although not on R as a
whole. Third, u is assumed to be skewed: for any x> 0, u(−x)< u(x).26 Under these assumptions,
we can characterize SPEs as follows.
Proposition 8. Suppose that Assumptions 1-4 and Assumption 6 hold. In the convex utility model,
an SPE exists, and any SPE ((ξA,ξB),(γ1(·), . . . ,γn(·))) is pure and satisfies the following:
1. (Policy Convergence) ξA(an) = ξB(an) = 1.
2. (At Most Two Candidates Contribute) For any profile (xA,xB) ∈R2 and any i = A,B, if there
are k,k′ ∈N such that k 6= k′ and cki,ck′i ∈R++ with γk(xA,xB)(cki)> 0 and γk′(xA,xB)(ck′i)>
0, then for all k′′ ∈ N \{k,k′}, γk′′(xA,xB)(0,0) = 1.
3. (No Contribution on Path) γk(an,an)(0,0) = 1 for all k ∈ N.
Proof. First, note that the part of the proof of Proposition 4 showing that the second-stage strategies
in any SPE are in pure strategies does not use the assumption that u is strictly concave, and they
go through even if it is convex. Hence, an SPE exists, and any SPE ((ξA,ξB),(γ1(·), . . . ,γn(·))) is
such that γk is pure for each k ∈ N.
It is straightforward to see that part 2 holds, by noting that the proof for the claim (1) in the
proof of Proposition 1 does not use any assumption about the functional form of u. It is also
immediate that part 3 is implied by part 1. Therefore, we only need to show part 1. To do so, take
any x 6= an, let k ∈ argmax`∈N [u`(x)− u`(an)], and fix a Nash equilibrium (c∗`A,c∗`B)`∈N , which
must be in pure strategies as argued in the previous paragraph, of the subgame after policy profile
(xA,xB) = (x,an).
26We will note on different assumptions on u at the end of this section.
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First, suppose that uk(x)−uk(an)≤ 0. Then c∗`A = 0 must hold for any ` ∈ N. Moreover, since
min`∈N [u`(x)−u`(an)]≤ un(x)−un(an)< 0, Assumption 3 implies that c1B = · · ·= cnB = 0 cannot
hold. That is, we must have c∗A = ∑`∈N c
∗
`A = 0< ∑`∈N c
∗
`B = c
∗
B, and hence, PB(c
∗
A,c
∗
B)> 1/2.
Second, suppose that uk(x)− uk(an) > 0. Note that this implies x < an. If x ≥ ak, then the
strict convexity of u implies u(x− ak)− u(an− ak) ≤ u(0)− u(an− x). If x < ak, then the same
inequality holds because u(0)> u(x−ak) and u(an−ak)> u(an−x). In either case, thus, we have
uk(x)−uk(an) = u(x−ak)−u(an−ak)≤ u(0)− (an− x)
< u(an−an)−u(x−an) = un(an)−un(x),
where the second inequality holds by the assumption that u is skewed. Then, as in the proof of
Proposition 2, we can conclude that PB(c∗A,c
∗
B)> 1/2.
In sum, we have shown that PB(c∗A,c
∗
B) > 1/2 in any Nash equilibrium of the subgame after
(xA,xB) = (x,an) with x 6= an. Given this, we can establish that ξA(an) = ξB(an) = 1 must hold in
any SPE, exactly in the same way as in the proof of Proposition 2. 
There are two differences from the conclusion of our analysis with concave utility function.
First, although the policies converge again, they converge to the position of one of the extreme lob-
byists, not to the middle. Second, the proof shows that the contribution pattern differs in subgames
where the policies diverge. More specifically, it is possible that a single candidate attracts contribu-
tions from two lobbyists. Moreover, the lobbyists who contribute are not the extreme lobbyists, but
those who are the closest to the candidate. These are in contrast with the case of concave utilities,
where each candidate raises a positive amount of contribution from one of the extreme lobbyists
whenever the policies diverge, and polices converge to aM in equilibrium.
Two further remarks are in order. First, although a symmetric argument can be made if we as-
sume u is skewed in the other direction, i.e., u(−x)> u(x) for all x> 0, a different conclusion holds
in the knife-edge case of symmetric lobbyist utilities, i.e., u(−x)= u(x) for all x> 0. In such a case,
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(ξA,ξB) is the profile of candidates’ strategies in an SPE if and only if ξA,ξB ∈ ∆({a1, . . . ,an}).
Thus, in particular, multiple equilibria exist. Second, one can extend our model to the case of mul-
tiple policy dimensions, where there are n(d) lobbyists in dimension d and all lobbyists in the same
dimension share the same shape of the utility function, as in Kamada and Kojima (2014). Then,
one can show that in the dimension for which lobbyists’ utilities are concave, policies converge to
a middle of the two extreme lobbyists in that dimension, and in the dimension for which lobbyists’
utilities are convex, policies converge to the position of one of the two extreme lobbyists in that
dimension.
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